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Abstract: While the energy transition of the EU housing stock is now being intensified with the
launch of the Renovation Wave, economic inequalities are increasing in many OECD countries, which
has effects on housing-related inequalities and the demand of affordable housing. The Renovation
Wave is thus an opportunity to improve housing quality for low-income households, but also
entails risks for increased rents. In Sweden, the standard of housing is relatively high and energy
poverty in multifamily housing is rare, meaning that there are limited social benefits to be achieved
from extensive energy retrofitting; moreover, Sweden lacks a social housing sector, which limits
protection of the worst-off residents. This paper thus explores whether the limited social benefits
of the Renovation Wave weigh up against the risks that it entails for the worst-off in the Swedish
context. This is done within a normative framework for just energy transitioning that is developed
within the context of the Renovation Wave and increasing economic inequalities, consisting of four
ordered principles: (1) The equal treatment principle; (2) The priority principle; (3) The efficiency
principle; and (4) The principle of procedural fairness. Analysis showed that to be considered just
according to our framework, the Swedish energy transition of housing should, in contradistinction to
what is suggested in the Renovation Wave, limit the imposition of extensive energy retrofitting in
low-income areas. Finally, having identified a mismatch between the most effective approaches in
terms of energy savings and the most acceptable approaches in terms of social justice, we offer policy
recommendations on how to bridge this mismatch in a Swedish context.
Keywords: Renovation Wave; social justice; framework for just energy transitioning; affordable
housing; energy transition; energy justice
1. Introduction
The potentially disastrous effects of climate change forces us to make radical changes
in all areas of society when it comes to energy use and carbon emissions. With 40% of the
European Union’s (EU) total end use of energy being used in buildings [1], improving the
energy efficiency of buildings and housing continues to be an important undertaking in
the EU’s energy transition. Within the European Green Deal—a growth plan aiming to
achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals by 2030 and union-wide decarbonisation
by 2050 [2]—a strategy to trigger a Renovation Wave for Europe was launched in 2020. The
main objective of the Renovation Wave is “to at least double the annual energy renovation
rate of residential and non-residential buildings by 2030 and to foster deep energy renova-
tions.” [3]. These high ambitions for increased investments in the building stock imply that
the Renovation Wave marks a new era in the energy transition of housing all across the EU,
which will affect people from all strands of society.
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Assuming that these comprehensive measures are inevitable in order to minimise
the negative effects of climate change, the question of how to implement such measures
poses great challenges from a social justice perspective. The unprecedented nature of
energy transitions makes every new case a case for scrutiny to ensure a development that is
both environmentally and socially sustainable; but apart from energy transitions’ inherent
novelty in terms of technology, practices, and environmental and social consequences, they
also tend to occur in unprecedented times [4]. The current situation of climate urgency is
indeed unmatched in history, and among the forerunners of sustainable energy transitions,
including many OECD countries in general and Nordic countries in particular [5], economic
inequality has been on the uprise since the 1980s [6]. It is thus of high relevance to ensure
that the Renovation Wave contributes to reduced—not increased—inequalities when rolling
over the European housing stock. While improving the energy performance of housing
in many EU member states enables a reduction of issues such as energy poverty and
vulnerability [7], imposing energy retrofits in low-income housing can also have negative
effects for residents such as increased rents, displacement or fear of displacement, and
tenant–landlord conflicts [8], and in the long run undermine the availability of affordable
housing if such availability is not strongly protected [9]. However, despite an abundance
of energy justice research on the interconnectivity between residents and buildings’ energy
use, little has been said about how energy transitions of housing stocks affect residents on
a more general level in an era of increasing economic inequalities [10]; this is of particular
interest as energy policy often focuses on the worst energy-performing buildings, which
tend to be located in segregated and economically disadvantaged areas [11,12]. Given
the high, and most likely costly, ambitions of the Renovation Wave in combination with
increasing vulnerability among the worst-off due to the rise of economic inequalities, there
is a need to scrutinise what structural injustices this strong focus on worst-performing
buildings could have for worst-off residents.
In this paper, we are going to give a first outline of the questions of social justice
that arise when going through an energy transition in residential housing, and we will
also give some preliminary answers and a framework on how to deal with these issues.
This will be achieved by combining normative theories on social justice with different
overarching approaches for reduced energy use in the housing stock. Using relevant
normative considerations and theories hopefully brings more depth and clarity to these
issues in the policy debate and can facilitate the design of effective and just measures in
member states’ implementation of energy policy in general and the Renovation Wave in
particular. In order to make the discussion and recommendations even more tangible,
this paper is limited to the Swedish multifamily housing stock as a case study. Sweden is
particularly interesting as the occurrence of energy poverty is low and the housing standard
is relatively high in a European context; this means that the social benefits of deep energy
retrofitting in terms of reduced energy costs and improved thermal comfort are lower than
in other EU member states, and it is thus of high relevance to carefully analyse the risks
and injustices that the Renovation Wave might entail in order to ensure that the risks do not
outweigh the opportunities. More so, Sweden lacks a social housing sector, which limits
the protection of economically disadvantaged residents, and residents’ vulnerability on
the housing market has been increasing along with the growing economic inequalities that
have increased at a higher rate in Sweden than in any other OECD country since the 1980s.
Sweden thus presents a clear case of the increasingly ubiquitous situation where extensive
energy retrofitting is carried out on a pressured and progressively unequal housing market.
Research Approach
This paper is based on normative analysis and argumentation where a set of normative
theories are applied to the Swedish context of energy transitioning and the Renovation
Wave. The research methodology is thus rather a research approach, where the different
chapters of the paper constitute different pieces of the puzzle in the normative argumen-
tation. The purpose of the different chapters and the structure of the paper are thus as
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follows. Section 2 outlines more details regarding the Renovation Wave and describes
the Swedish context of increased economic inequalities and the housing market on which
the Renovation Wave will be rolled out. This chapter thus defines the specific context.
Section 3 then describes overarching approaches for reduced energy use in the housing
stock and evaluates their respective feasibility and energy savings potential in the Swedish
context. This chapter consequently offers different alternatives to energy use reduction in
the housing stock that later can be evaluated and compared from a normative standpoint.
Based on normative theories relevant for the distribution of benefits and burdens, Section 4
then develops a preliminary framework for how an energy transition of the housing stock
in general, and the Renovation Wave in particular, can be carried out in a manner that
is considered socially just within the previously described context. This chapter thus
provides a normative foundation from which an argumentation can be built. In Section 5,
the preliminary framework for a just energy transition of the housing stock developed in
Section 4 is applied to the different approaches described in Section 3 in light of the context
described in Section 2, with the aim to analyse which approaches are considered more and
less just. Based on the normative analysis and argumentation in Section 5, Section 6 offers
more concrete policy recommendations for the Swedish context. The paper concludes with
a summary of the main findings in Section 7. A flowchart of the research approach can be
seen in Figure 1, showing the conceptual (rather than chronological) research approach in
this paper.
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2. The Renovation Wave in a Context of Increasing Economic Inequality
The building stock is a high priority for improved energy efficiency in the EU [13].
Central objectives in the EU for 2030 are to improve overall energy efficiency by 32.5%
(compared to projections of the expected energy use in 2030) [14] and to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions by 55% (compared to 1990 levels) [15]. Directive EU/2018/844 on the energy
performance of buildings guides member states in how to achieve these goals through deep
energy retrofitting of the existing building stock, primarily focusing on worst-performing
buildings, and a near zero-energy standard for new construction.
In 2020, the EU launched the Renovation Wave. Given that energy efficiency mea-
sures more often than not are carried out in conjunction with general refurbishment,
the Renovation Wave is a strategy for improving the energy performance of buildings
through an increased renovation rate. It is launched as a part of the European Green
Deal, which contains a set of policy initiatives with the overarching goal to make Europe
climate neutral by 2050. The Renovation Wave contributes with guidelines and regulations
for achieving this overarching goal in the building sector and focuses on action in three
main areas: (i) decarbonisation of heating and cooling; (ii) tackling energy poverty and
worst-performing buildings; and (iii) renovation of public buildings [3]. Apart from in-
creasing the rate of renovation, the aim is also to stimulate deeper renovations, i.e., achieving
greater energy savings in each renovation project. This means that the EU commission is
mainly seeking an increase in extensive and comprehensive renovations that inevitably
will be costly. At the same time, there are prominent goals considering the affordability of
energy-efficient and sustainable housing to allow all groups of society to have access to
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high-quality accommodation. Although a number of different funding solutions are to be
established, the access to and distribution of funds will be managed at the member-state
level [3], meaning that there are no guarantees that funding will be earmarked for afford-
able housing or low-income households [16]. More so, the conflict between expensive
energy renovations and housing affordability is likely to remain as minimum requirements
for energy performance are expected [17], meaning that investments not covered by energy
savings could be imposed [18].
Sweden tends to have more ambitious energy and climate policies than the EU in
general, and apart from complying with EU regulations and targets, Sweden has a national
target to reduce the energy intensity in relation to GDP with 50% from 2005 to 2030 [19].
In the housing stock, this target can be interpreted as improving buildings’ energy perfor-
mance (energy use per square meter and year, kWh/(m2 × year)) by 50% over the same
period of time. Decarbonisation of the Swedish housing stock has progressed successfully
since the oil crises in the 1970s [20], and the housing stock is today highly decarbonised
with district heating dominating in multifamily buildings [21] and heat pumps rapidly
increasing in single-family houses [22]. Consequently, having come far on the journey
towards decarbonisation, much attention is now being directed towards improved energy
performance in the housing stock in general, and in the multifamily housing stock in par-
ticular. Energy use for heating and domestic hot water in multifamily buildings accounts
for around one third of such energy needs in residential and commercial buildings, and
approximately 7% of the total end use of energy in Sweden [22]. Two of the main barriers
to increased energy performance in the Swedish multifamily housing stock is a lack of
profitability in energy retrofitting [23] as well as difficulties to assess profitability [24]; thus,
although energy performance has continued to improve since the 1970s, and although
the energy performance of buildings in Sweden is relatively high compared to other EU
member states, there is still great potential to reduce the energy use at the building stock
level. It can thus be expected that the Renovation Wave will spur a lot of activity in the
Swedish multifamily housing stock, and that both renovation rate and depth will increase.
There is, however, a concern among Swedish housing companies that the Renovation Wave
will impose unprofitable energy retrofits [18].
2.1. The Social Aspects of the Renovation Wave
A strong focus on worst-performing buildings is argued for in the Renovation Wave
as well as in Swedish energy policy. Within the EU, this focus is strongly connected to the
widespread issue of energy poverty. Energy poverty can be defined as a state in which
households struggle to keep their home adequately warm either due to financial reasons or
owing to their geographic [25], social [26], or national-specific context [27]. Households
suffering from energy poverty are often, but not always, in a combined situation of low
income, low energy performance of the dwelling, and high energy prices [28]. Improved
energy performance can thus be one way to reduce a household’s vulnerability to energy
poverty and has been adapted as the main remedy for energy poverty in the Renovation
Wave. In Sweden, there is however a very low prevalence of energy poverty [29]. This
is partly due to the relatively high energy performance of buildings in combination with
relatively low energy prices and a strong social support system, but also the fact that heating
costs are included in the rent in the vast majority of multifamily housing in Sweden, a
system often called “warm rent” [30]. Unlike in EU policy, where there is a clear social
incentive to focus on worst-performing buildings, the focus on worst-performing buildings
in Sweden lacks such concerns and is rather driven by maximising cost-effectiveness in
energy retrofitting.
Although national and international climate and energy targets are significant drivers
for improved energy performance of buildings, there are also numerous benefits to be
harvested for residents and property owners from such measures. Among these are reduced
energy costs and improved indoor climate. A household does not have to be defined as
energy poor in order to suffer from high energy costs or a poor indoor climate; effects of
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inadequate heating, and/or draught due to air leakage or poor insulation in the building
envelope, can be poor thermal comfort with high moisture loads causing condensation
and even mould growth [31]. Such conditions can have negative effects on health and risk
leading to illness or disease among residents [32]. Severe conditions of this sort constitute
a relatively small issue in Sweden owing to a good housing standard and comparatively
progressive regulation concerning indoor climate [33], but it constitutes a widespread
problem in many EU member states [34].
There can thus evidently be many social benefits from the Renovation Wave and
improved energy performance of housing, but the rather aggressive roll-out of a policy-
program of this sort that imposes extensive and expensive retrofits can also entail risks
for vulnerable resident groups. In Sweden, where the expected social benefits of energy
retrofitting arguably are not as high as in other EU member states, it is thus of high relevance
to carefully analyse the risks and injustices that the Renovation Wave might entail in order
to ensure that the risks do not outweigh the opportunities. As the risks associated with the
Renovation Wave are closely linked to the situation of economic inequality and housing
segregation, the following section will describe the Swedish context of how the economic
development over the past decades has led to a deeply unequal housing market.
2.2. Economic Inequality, Housing, and the Renovation Wave
Caused by an uprise of neoliberal ideas and tax reforms, economic inequalities have
increased in many OECD countries since the 1980s [35]. Among OECD countries, Sweden
is the country that has experienced the most rapid increase in income inequality, although
inequality levels in Sweden remain comparatively low [36]. Nevertheless, this develop-
ment has led to increased residential segregation [37] and increased vulnerability among
households that request access to affordable housing.
Sweden lacks a formalised provision of social housing, but public municipal housing
companies have traditionally owned a significant share of the rental housing stock [38],
and rental housing is more common in Sweden (36.4%) than in most other EU member
states (30.2% on average) [39]. For most of the 20th century (1940–1990), the objective of
municipal housing companies was to provide “housing for all” [40], and with a strong
focus on affordability and social sustainability municipal housing companies offered a
feasible alternative to pure social housing. This period of time was characterised by
strong housing regulations and heavily subsidised housing policy that aimed to relieve the
pressing housing shortage and the generally low housing standard that prevailed [41]. In
1964, it was decided that one million dwellings were to be constructed during 1965–1975,
which was carried out and achieved in the so called Million Homes Programme [42].
About one third of the dwellings were constructed as single-family houses whereas the
rest were constructed in multifamily buildings to a large extent situated on the outskirts
of cities around Sweden. The completion of the Million Homes Programme provided an
unprecedented opportunity for many households to access a modern dwelling.
However, deregulation of the housing market in the early 1990s ended a long period of
socially oriented housing policy [41]. Apart from subsidies and favourable loans being cut
off, tenant associations’ leverage was also reduced [40]. As municipal housing companies
were slowly forced into competing with private housing companies, parts of municipal
housing stocks were sold to private housing companies or converted into tenant–owner
cooperatives (similar to housing cooperatives), and the increased competition undermined
municipal housing companies’ social commitment e.g., through introduction of minimum
income requirements for leases [43].
The combination of reduced social commitment in housing supply, increased hous-
ing shortage owing to under-production of new buildings, and increasing economic
inequalities—now also spurred by the 1990s financial crisis—set the stage for an increas-
ingly precarious housing market that is very different from the one that existed at the
end of the Million Homes Programme. At the end of the 1990s, Sweden’s largest cities
had the highest levels of ethnic residential segregation among OECD countries [44] and
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residential segregation by income was higher than ever before in Sweden [37]. Yet, little
political action towards increased supply of affordable housing has been taken. In 2000,
a law stating that municipal housing companies have a responsibility to provide hous-
ing for all inhabitants in the municipality was enforced [45], which somewhat ensured
affordable housing supply. However, municipalities are not obliged to have municipal
housing companies, and the municipal housing companies are restricted by the 2011 law
about municipal housing companies [46] that regulates the fiscal transfers over longer time
periods and between the municipality and the municipal housing companies, undermining
long-term perspectives in investments and forcing them to sell parts of their housing stock
to finance renovations [45,46]. Needless to say, this further constrained municipal housing
companies’ ability to provide affordable housing and to constitute a feasible substitute to
social housing [47].
Today, access to housing is increasingly dependent on economic resources [47], and
the housing system has become a reproducer of economic inequalities [48]. Many of the
suburban areas of multifamily buildings from the Million Homes Programme are economi-
cally and ethnically segregated areas with increasing over-crowdedness, especially on the
outskirts of larger cities [49]. Several market mechanisms are limiting the construction
of affordable housing [50]; this in combination with municipal housing companies being
forced to sell parts of their housing stocks to comply with the law [46] has caused the
supply of affordable housing to fall short of the demand [51]. As a consequence, the
second- and third-hand rental markets have grown, and legal as well as illegal subletting
are becoming more frequent; of course, the lack of affordable housing, and to some extent
the lack of housing in general, is forcing rents on the illegal second- and third-hand markets
above the regulated levels [51,52]. Moreover, increased globalisation and financialisaton
of housing [53] have attracted international private equity firms to invest in housing with
rent levels below market levels, i.e., affordable housing, and carry out measures that al-
low them to rapidly increase the rents [54]. In Sweden, such investments have mainly
occurred in the suburban areas of multifamily buildings constructed during the Million
Homes Programme [55,56], where vulnerability to increased rents is high. Yet, Swedish
rent regulation states that apart from the collective negotiations between landlords and
tenants’ associations that determine yearly rent increases, rents can only be increased after
specified apartment qualities have been upgraded [57]; this is how renovations have come
to constitute the motor in strategies for possible rent increases.
Retrofitting on an Unequal and Pressured Housing Market
Rent setting in general and rent increases in conjunction with renovations in particular
are rather strictly regulated in Sweden compared to in other EU member states. General rent
levels are collectively negotiated between landlords and tenants’ associations, and while
renovation measures are legally a matter between landlords and tenants only, rent increases
after renovation are negotiated with tenants’ associations. In every renovation project,
housing companies thus negotiate with the tenants regarding the measures included in
the renovation project, and in larger renovation projects, tenants’ associations are often
contacted by the landlord. Measures that in some way increase the standard, quality, or
utility of the apartment, so called quality-upgrading measures, allow for rent increases
whereas measures that merely aim to restore the apartment, or measures for general
refurbishment of common building services, do not [57]. For example, installation of a
modern kitchen (with, e.g., a built-in microwave) or bathroom (with an electric towel dryer)
would, e.g., count as quality-upgrading measures, whereas improved energy performance
of the building or restoration of damaged components/interior usually would not. Owing
to how the Swedish rent regulation is constructed, many private housing companies
systematically carry out quality-upgrading renovations to increase rents in their housing
stock [58]. As renovation projects often contain a set of different retrofitting measures,
it is not uncommon that energy efficiency measures are conducted alongside quality-
upgrading measures.
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The fact that energy efficiency measures usually do not enable rent increases suggests
that the Renovation Wave with its strong focus on buildings’ energy performance should
not constitute a risk for increased rents. Although this is theoretically true, many factors
add up to create a situation where the Renovation Wave in practice—through inclusion of
quality-upgrading measures in energy retrofitting projects—could indeed become a driver
for increased rents and inequalities on the housing market in general and in low-income
areas in particular. First, there is a pressure among housing companies to increase rents due
to the general housing shortage in Sweden, which makes it possible to significantly increase
rents and still find tenants [58]. It has been suggested that during a housing shortage,
the Swedish rent regulation system creates economic incentives for quality-upgrading
beyond what would be feasible in a market system; apart from constituting a suboptimal
use of financial and ecological resources, this risks leading to increased gentrification [58].
More so, private housing companies’ increased acquisition of affordable housing creates a
pressure to close the gap between affordable housing and market rent levels [58].
Second, in the general Swedish discourse (public and policy oriented), it is in partic-
ular multifamily buildings from the Million Homes Programme that have been pointed
out as the worst-performing buildings in need of energy retrofitting as well as general
refurbishment [59]. As the buildings constructed during the Million Homes Programme
are reaching their service life of 50 years, there is indeed a need for general refurbish-
ment which can be combined with energy-efficiency measures [24]. However, given the
socioeconomic vulnerability in many of these areas, it has been argued that renovations
should be carried out in a gentle manner with as little measures as possible to ensure an
adequate housing standard out of consideration for the tenants [60], or by offering tenants
different renovation options [61] where the least expensive option preferably entails no rent
increase at all [62]. Such careful and considerate renovation methods are, however, not in
line with the high energy efficiency ambitions of the Renovation Wave, as increased social
consideration often compromises energy savings [60,61], and vice versa [63]. Looking
beyond the Million Homes Programme, the general trend of energy performance being
higher in higher-income areas remains [11]; thus, the worst-performing buildings, which
are prioritised in the Renovation Wave, are often found in low-income areas. It is thus a
common notion in the public debate, supported by the focus on worst-performing build-
ings in the Renovation Wave, that the primary need for extensive energy retrofitting is
found in low-income areas in general and in housing from the Million Homes Programme
in particular.
Third, as profitability is often difficult to achieve in deep energy retrofitting projects [60],
it has been documented how landlords include quality-upgrading measures in their energy
retrofits to enable rent increases and thus improve the cost-effectiveness of the retrofitting
project [60,61]. There are of course many factors that influence the profitability in energy
retrofitting projects, such as the discount rate, reduced maintenance costs, and other
assumptions about e.g., future energy prices and rent levels; but increasing the rent after
renovation is one way to improve profitability in renovation projects and can also be a
means to quickly increase the property taxation value. In addition, the long pay-back times
that extensive energy-efficiency measures such as additional façade insulation can entail
requires a long-term perspective that many profit-driven housing companies lack [60],
especially on an increasingly financialised housing market. More so, as improved energy
performance does not suffice for rent increases, landlords face the risk of actually having
to lower their rents due to reduced energy costs [64], which again increases the pressure
to find other means to improve profitability, such as increased rents. The fact that the
Renovation Wave strongly pushes for deep energy retrofitting will contribute to increased
tension between energy savings and profitability, which in turn will increase the pressure
among housing companies in Sweden to include quality-upgrading measures in their
energy retrofitting projects.
Finally, some landlords seek to increase profitability and property value by replacing
residents of lower socioeconomic status with residents of higher socioeconomic status [65].
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Speculation and gentrification are known to push up rents, and displacement of residents
is sometimes achieved through the phenomena known as “renoviction” [66] or “green
gentrification” [67,68]; the latter refers to cases when landlords hide their underlying
motives of tenant replacement behind a façade of ecological sustainability objectives.
However, perhaps more common is the process of exclusionary displacement [69], where
quality upgrading of apartments and consequential rent increase is carried out after a
tenant has voluntarily moved, meaning that the next tenant to move in is likely to have
a higher socioeconomic status than the tenant that moved out. While such exclusionary
displacement does not force residents away, it still contributes to a process of gentrification
and a more long-term undermining of affordable housing availability [61]. Although it
remains unknown to what extent the Renovation Wave will contribute to these types of
tenant displacing phenomena, it will nonetheless offer a “green” façade that risk being
used for socially unsustainable purposes.
In summary, although it is not custom to increase rents based on energy efficiency
measures, several interacting factors contribute to a general pressure among landlords to
include other measures that enable rent increases in energy retrofitting projects, and in
low-income areas in particular, such as:
• A general housing shortage (mainly of affordable housing) in Sweden, which enables
housing companies to renovate to increase rents to a greater extent than if there were
no such shortage;
• Challenges to achieve profitability in extensive energy retrofitting projects;
• Loopholes in the rent-setting regulation, which allow for rent increases for specific
quality-upgrading measures;
• A strong focus on multifamily housing in energy policy, and on areas from the Million
Homes Programme in particular;
• Focus on worst-performing buildings in the Renovation Wave where low-income
residents are overrepresented;
• Private companies with explicit business models of acquiring, renovating, and subse-
quently selling multifamily buildings in low-income areas.
Apart from the multiple factors that interact to create a pressure to increase rents
under the Renovation Wave, retrofitting does not only have economic implications for
tenants but also include elements of negotiation and power-relations between tenants
(partly through tenants’ associations) and landlords. In local and appeal court decisions
on renovation measures, it has been found that more than 90% of cases are ruled in the
landlord’s favour [70]. Studies have shown frequent negative emotions among tenants in
renovation projects in general [71], and energy retrofitting in particular [72]. Inevitably,
economic inequalities and residential segregation have implications for these experiences
and processes too. The general housing segmentation, causing tenant-owned housing
to dominate among high-income earners, causes the most well-off to have maximum
influence on and control over renovation processes in their home. Among well-off tenants,
who assumingly can exert the maximum influence possible on renovation processes in
rental housing, it has been shown that influence over the renovation process is possible
yet limited [73]. This suggests, and it has been shown [62,74], that the worst-off have
limited possibilities to influence renovation processes, especially considering the increase
in illegal subletting, which is likely to significantly compromise tenants’ exertion of power
towards landlords.
With a weakened position of the Swedish municipal housing companies, and an
increasing prevalence of private housing companies with short-term perspectives on
management and profits in low-income areas, we find that the Renovation Wave might
put increased pressure for rent increases on already pressured parts of the housing stock
as illustrated in Figure 2. Although companies act very differently and it is impossible to
predict what the outcome will be from each renovation case, there are multiple factors that
risk leading to increased inequalities in the housing stock and society as a whole. In light of
the increasing economic inequalities in Sweden, and the general lack of affordable housing,
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this paper ultimately asks and tries to answer the question: What would it mean for the
Renovation Wave to be just in a Swedish context, and can we achieve a just energy transition
by putting the worst-performing buildings at the frontline, which is now the case?
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3. Ways to Reduce Energy Use in the Housing Stock
To acknowledge that the Renovation Wave is not the only solution to reduce energy
use in the housing stock but that there are innumerable ways to improve energy efficiency
and reduce energy demand, this section will outline the different main approaches. The
focus here will be on the overarching housing stock level, concerning the buildings and
the residents’ interactions with the buildings only. Simply put, the total yearly energy use
in a specific ho sing stock can be described by Equation (1), where the total energy use
is the total sum of the buildings’ energy use per square meter (energy performance (EP),
kWh/(m2 × year)) multiplied with the building area (m2).
Yearly energy use in housing stock = Σ(EP × A) (1)
In order to reduce the yearly energy use in the housing stock, the two main approaches
are thus (i) to reduce the energy use per square meter, i.e., improve the energy performance
of buildings; and (ii) to reduce the needed area in a certain housing stock. The following
sections will cover how these different approaches can be realised and detail the proved
and/or predicted feasibility of the different measures in terms of energy savings, cost
effectiveness, and general acceptance and recognition. A building’s energy performance
is here defined as a building’s yearly energy use for heating, domestic hot water, and
electricity use for common services. Households’ electricity use for appliances is thus
excluded, meaning that the fo us will be on energy use dictated by the building’s c nstruc-
tion and installations (and the residents’ interaction with these). In doing so, the focal point
becomes the actual buildings, rather than household appliances situated in them, which is
in line with international targets and strategies for reduce energy us at th housing stock
level [13].
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3.1. Improving Buildings’ Energy Performance
Improved energy performance of buildings has been, and continues to be, the central
strategy for reduced energy use in the housing stock. It is embedded in the core of our
understanding of “energy efficiency” to deliver the same service at a reduced energy use;
the service in this case being a fixed area of heated and ventilated space. Returning to
Equation (1), efforts to reduce energy use in the housing stock are thus almost exclusively
directed towards improved energy performance (EP) rather than reduced area (A). As
the energy performance of a building is affected by both the technical efficiency of the
building’s structure and installations as well as by the residents’ energy-related behaviour,
ways to improve technical efficiency and ways to improve energy-efficient behaviour will
here be described separately.
3.1.1. Improved Technical Performance
The Renovation Wave mainly focuses on renovations that improve the technical
efficiency of buildings. For a building to operate in a way that ensures comfort and a
good indoor environment, energy is primarily needed for heating, domestic hot water, and
ventilation. To improve the technical efficiency of a building, these energy demands can
either be reduced through energy retrofitting, or the energy supply to meet these demands
can be made more efficient by installing more efficient energy technologies. Reduced energy
demand through energy retrofitting is achieved by reducing the transmission of heat from
the building. This can be done with renovation measures on the building envelope, such as
adding additional insulation to reduce transmission; assure airtightness of the building
envelope; replacing windows with alternatives with lower transmission; adding insulation
to roofs, attics, or water pipes; etc. Installing heat exchange between exhaust air and
supply air in the ventilation also reduces the building’s heating demand. Reduced energy
use for heating can also be achieved without reducing the building’s heating demand by
instead replacing the current heating system with a more efficient system, e.g., substitute an
oil-fired boiler with a heat pump, so that less energy is needed to produce the same amount
of heat. Similar to such technological substitution, continuous technological improvements
make upgrading of installed appliances such as heat and circulation pumps to newer and
more efficient alternatives a feasible option to improve energy performance [75].
Although there are many well-tested and developed methods for energy-saving
renovations, policy and financial support have remained limited, which in combination
with high upfront investment costs and long pay-back times have kept the renovation
rates low in Sweden [76]. Cost-effectiveness tends to be the highest in worst-performing
buildings as a low energy performance often indicates that there are “low hanging fruit”
in terms of improved energy performance, which is why worst-performing buildings are
specifically targeted in the Renovation Wave as well as in Swedish energy policy. The
existing barriers and the slow renovation rate are some of the reasons to why the Renovation
Wave is now being initiated, and as the objective of this policy initiative is to remove at
least some of the barriers and offer more financial support, a positive development in the
general feasibility of energy-saving renovations is to be expected. In terms of technological
substitution and installation of more efficient versions of already installed technologies,
the barriers have in general been lower, partly owing to lower upfront costs [75].
Policies for reduced energy use in the housing stock are mainly focused on improved
technical energy efficiency of buildings in line with the above-described measures, as
confirmed by the Renovation Wave. Many policymakers, researchers, and practitioners
have much faith in the potency of improved technical energy efficiency in conjunction
with general refurbishment. Although it is technically possible to significantly reduce a
building’s energy performance through technical energy efficiency measures, the issue
of profitability and cost-effectiveness remains a challenge in energy retrofitting projects
for many housing companies. More so, it is important to not only focus on the building’s
energy performance, but to also consider the embodied energy, climate, and environmental
impact that renovation projects and measures entail [77]. Finding measures that reduce
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the building’s energy use at the minimum “cost” in terms of energy use and emissions for
construction and materials is key for sustainable energy retrofitting.
3.1.2. More Energy-Efficient Behaviour
Beyond the efficiency of a building’s structure and installations, residents’ interactions
with the building have implications for the amount of energy needed to operate the
building, and residents’ energy-related behaviour can both increase and decrease the
building’s energy performance. Residents’ impact on a building’s energy performance
mainly depends on their energy-related behaviour in connection to heating and domestic
hot water use [78]. In terms of heating, residents’ impact mainly concerns choice of indoor
temperature and manually induced ventilation by opening windows [78]. However, the
energy performance of the building affects the potency of behavioural change to impact the
energy use. For example, changes in indoor temperature have a lower impact on heating
demand in well-insulated buildings than in less-insulated buildings. This is, however, not
the case regarding energy use for domestic hot water. Domestic hot water use varies greatly
among different households and depends both on behavioural patterns and household
size [79].
To reduce buildings’ energy use through behavioural changes, residents must have
some sort of incentive to change their behaviour. This could, e.g., either be a will to do
good for the environment or purely economic incentives. Economic incentives only exist if
the residents’ energy use for heating and/or domestic hot water is measured and billed at
the household level, which is the case in most EU member states. However, in Sweden,
energy use for heating and hot water was formerly rarely measured and billed individually
for households. Heating and water expenses are instead included as a fixed component
in the monthly rent, which is then often referred to as “warm rent”. This system leaves
residents with no economic incentives to change their energy-related behaviour (regarding
heating and domestic hot water) as it would not affect their arguably invisible energy
costs. This gives rise to an issue of split incentives between the residents and the property
owner [80], and as a remedy, directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency requires energy
for heating and hot water to be measured and billed for individual households in order to
incentivise more energy-efficient behaviour. Although Sweden has tried to argue for the
benefits of warm rent, among which are the fact that it gives landlords economic incentives
to invest in energy efficiency, a compromise with the EU commission was reached in 2019
requiring that energy for heating should be individually metered and billed in worst-
performing multifamily buildings [81]. It was also decided that energy for domestic hot
water should be individually metered and billed in new construction and deeply renovated
buildings [82].
The potential for reduced energy use through behavioural change has been estimated
at 10–25% [83]. Regarding energy use for domestic hot water, individualisation of metering
and billing has shown promising yet varying results [84]; however, it has also been found
that low-income households experience significant cost increases from this measure as
household size, i.e., the number of residents in the household that use hot water for e.g.,
showering, tends to be greater among low-income earners [85]. More so, increased time
at home due to e.g., unemployment or illness will further increase water use among the
worst-off [85]. Thus, although low-income households might significantly reduce their
water consumption after implementation of individual metering and billing, the fact that
they still consume more water than the average household would cause increased costs
regardless of water-saving behaviour [85]. Overall, as the implementation of individual
metering and billing of energy for heating and domestic hot water remains low in Sweden,
there are many barriers for achieving energy savings through behavioural changes as there
most often are split incentives between residents and property owners, and as potential
energy cost reductions are relatively low owing to low energy prices. The barriers for
energy savings through behavioural change in Sweden has thus been estimated as relatively
high [75].
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3.2. Reducing per Capita Living Space
As was shown in Equation (1), another way to reduce the total energy use in the
housing stock is to limit the total building area, or to use it more efficiently. For many
decades, improvements in buildings’ energy performance have to some extent been offset
by increased living space per person [86], which can be understood as a rebound effect
due to the improved efficiency [87]. Consequently, there are reasons to not only focus on
improving energy performance but to also try to utilise the area in the existing building
stock more efficiently to limit the living space per capita and reduce the need for new
building construction [88]. Yet, reducing living space per capita is rarely recognised as
a means to reduce energy use for housing, although implications of space utilisation
on energy use is gaining more and more attention in the commercial sector such as in
office buildings and hotels [89]. One of the reasons as to why energy performance of
housing is being politically advocated while little policy is concerned with housing size
is the hesitancy to decrease overall production. Although over-consumption of products,
recourses, and energy is the root to many contemporary challenges, our economic system
and social norms prefer green consumption over reduced consumption. Thus, it is usually
more politically feasible to promote “greening”, i.e., improved energy performance, over
reduced consumption, i.e., reduced dwelling size.
The average living space per capita in the Swedish housing stock is among the highest
in the EU [90]. However, distribution of area in the Swedish housing stock is far from even
as residential density varies greatly between different demographic and socioeconomic
groups [11], as can be seen in Figure 3, and differences between different income groups
are increasing [11]; the current trend is that low-income households are living more and
more densely, with over-crowdedness becoming increasingly prevalent [91], while there is
little to no change in the average living space per capita in higher income segments [11].
As the per capita living space linearly affects the per capita energy use for housing (see
Figure 3), the increasing gap between low-income and high-income households’ energy use
can be understood in the light of the increasing economic inequalities that increasingly are
affecting access to housing. Although over-crowdedness is highly recognised as a societal
problem with potential negative effects on health and well-being, excess of living space as
a driver for energy use in housing is overlooked in the general discourse, meaning that
there is little effort being put into limiting excessive living space per capita. Yet, Figure 3
shows that the per capita energy use is more closely correlated to per capita area use than
to buildings’ energy performance, suggesting that reduced living space per capita can be
an effective means to reduce per capita energy use in the housing stock. Figure 3 shows
multifamily buildings only and does therefore not include vacation dwellings; the inclusion
of vacation dwellings would further amplify the differences between income deciles.
Looking at building stock level, a higher residential density leads to many benefits in
terms of resource efficiency, including a lower energy use, as it contributes to an economy of
scale where the energy needed for each individual to heat, ventilate air, and use hot water
for cooking and washing will be reduced [92]. The fact that household size is decreasing,
causing the average living space per capita to increase, in many parts of the world has been
argued as a great challenge for reduced resource use and carbon footprint per capita [93].
Finally, Table 1 shows a synthesis of the estimated energy-saving potential, barriers,
and political/general recognition of the three main approaches for reduced energy use in
the housing stock that were described in this chapter.
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4. A Preliminary Framework for Just Energy Transitioning
There are a wide range of competing fundamental normative theories, considerations,
approaches, and frameworks in the social justice literature relevant for the Renovation
Wave (see e.g., [94]). Famously, Sovacool and Dworkin [94] outlaid a framework for just
energy transitioning where they describe a wide range of fundamental normative principles
and then try to use these to produce a practical decision-making tool for decision-makers.
What w are going to do he e is somethi g similar, partly building on this framework,
but tailored for the Renovation Wave within a context of increasing housing-related and
economic inequalities. To do this, we will add some fundamental normative theories
regarding distribution and adjust the focus such that the emphasis is on our particular
case. In the case of the Renovation Wave, everyone agrees that the targets set for energy
efficiency and decarbonisation should be in line with internationally determined climate
targets, hence this framework does not at all need to focus on environmental sustainability,
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and little consideration is needed regarding intergenerational equity, and such. Instead,
the focus is on how the Renovation Wave might affect people during and after it has
taken place.
Ideally, when creating a justice framework for whatever it may be, we want to find
more directly applicable derivative normative considerations that all reasonable fundamen-
tal normative theories can agree upon. Normative theories relevant for the distribution of
benefits and burdens will be presented in Section 4.1; from these, a framework consisting of
normative principles relevant for the particular subject area will be derived in Section 4.2;
and the framework will finally be elaborated with more concrete policy recommendations
for the Swedish context in Section 6. In bioethics, for example, there is a famous example
of such a convergence often called “the four principles of bioethics” by Beauchamp and
Childress [95], according to which people in health care, for instance, should do no harm
and produce benefits while respecting people’s autonomy and the principles of justice.
These four principles have then been used in everything from practical guidelines on the
shop floor, pertaining how to treat patients who do not want to subscribe to a medical
regime that would benefit them in terms of giving them a better health, to how to set our
priorities in a global pandemic. The upside with such a framework, which is in part why
Beauchamp and Childress’ principles have become so popular, is that it is transparent to
everyone where the ultimate justifications lie, which implies that it is easy for others to
understand, to challenge, and to build upon when new needs arise in the future.
4.1. Procedures, Outcomes, and Currencies
In the social justice debate, there are two main focal points: procedures (procedural
justice) and outcomes (substantive justice) [96]. Knowing from Section 2 that economic as
well as housing-related inequalities have implications for procedures as well as outcomes
of renovations, we are inclined to consider both of these when deriving our normative
framework. Remember that the goal here is to find a position that every (reasonable) nor-
mative theory can agree upon; this is why we need to apply the theories which, according
to their proponents, would be relevant regarding our case.
4.1.1. Procedural Accounts
According to the pure proceduralist accounts, an outcome is just if, and only if (iff), it
has been produced by a just or fair procedure. Thus, the outcomes do not make a difference
in terms of justice when it comes to these views; only procedures have these effects. For
example, if we have a just procedure (whatever that is), and this procedure produces
extreme inequalities, these inequalities are to be considered just (e.g., [97]). So, if the free
market is such a just procedure, then whatever effects this market has, these should be
considered just.
There are a number of procedural accounts but according to the most developed
accounts, such as Daniels and Sabin’s Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R) [98], which
has been applied to a large extent in the discussion about priority setting in health care,
(1) people affected by a decision need to be informed by the decision (i.e., decisions and
their rationales must be public); (2) the rationales need to appeal to evidence, reasons, and
principles that are accepted as relevant by fair-minded people who are disposed to finding
mutually justifiable terms of cooperation; (3) there must be mechanisms for challenge and
dispute resolution regarding limit-setting decisions, and, more broadly, opportunities for
revision and improvement of policies in the light of new evidence and arguments; and
(4) there must be a voluntary or public regulation of the process to ensure that conditions
1–3 are met [98] (p. 45). The “fair-minded people” mentioned here can either be those who
are affected or others such as people of the court or the people’s representatives, just to
mention a few examples. In addition, everyone needs to be well-informed, reasonable, and
the worst-off must be represented on an equal footing in order to guarantee that this group
can express themselves freely without being censored or censoring themselves (cf. [99])
(for a similar view, see also the vast discussion on “the ethics of risk” where Sven-Ove
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Hansson, among others, argue that those who are put at risk should also have influence
over the decision being made (and preferably also reap the possible benefits) (e.g., [100]).
This is in line with most procedural theories in a situation such as the Renovation Wave,
where the worst-off are disenfranchised while at the same time being at the greatest risk of
being negatively affected from the upcoming renovations.
Of course, these procedures could be situated at different levels, such as at the micro-
level for the tenants in an individual building, the meso-level at the level of the municipality,
or the macro-level, which could be the central government. This will not be further
elaborated on here other than that if one really wants to make sure that the procedure is
fair according to 1–4, there will most likely be a need for a voice from the people who are
affected by the Renovation Wave; this so that both the arguments from their perspective
arise, and so that the strength of these arguments are understood. Another point to make
here is that there is (perhaps too much) leeway in how to understand what constitutes A4R.
For example, how should we define a “fair-minded individual”? Now, some of these issues
should be solved in actual debates. Compare with common law systems where you need
to argue your point in cases, and where judges can use precedents from previous cases as
support for what to think in the current case but who also listen to new arguments and
can thereby produce a new precedent. There will also be a lot of cases where most people
simply will have the same opinion. Lastly, normative theories, such as the outcome-based
(or end-state) theories discussed in the next paragraph are usually thought to be a part of
what it means for a person to e.g., be “fair minded”.
4.1.2. Outcome-Based Accounts
According to pure outcome-based theories instead, an outcome is just, iff the outcome
has certain patterns such that it is just. There are a number of theories specifying what
these features are but the main difference between the pure procedural accounts and the
pure outcome-based accounts is that for the latter how the outcome was produced makes
no difference, only that the outcome has a certain set of features. For example, if great
inequalities are by the outcome-based accounts considered to be unjust, then it does not
matter from the point of view of justice if it was produced by, e.g., voluntary choice—it is
still unjust. There are many outcome-based theories but the most common ones relevant to
the case of the Renovation Wave in a context of inequality are those of sufficientarianism
(e.g., [101,102]), egalitarianism (e.g., [103,104]), prioritarianism (e.g., [105,106]), utilitarian-
ism (e.g., [107,108]), and desert (e.g., [109,110]) (there are other theories which also might be
relevant here such as luck-egalitarianism [111] or theories about recognition [112]; however,
we believe that the implications in terms of reasoning and outcomes of the theories being
left out are encompassed by the combination of normative theories and values discussed
in this paper).
Very roughly, according to these theories, an outcome is just, iff everyone is over a
sufficiency threshold; everyone is equally well of; the value is maximised but where every
incremental increase in value counts for more for the least well-off; maximising the value
where everyone’s increase in value counts equally; or giving people what they deserve.
So, for example, if we are prioritarian, we believe that one unit of subjective well-being is
worth more when it is given to someone who is worse off than another, which in turn gives
us reason to distribute this unit of well-being, ceteris paribus, to the worse off individual.
However, if we were utilitarian instead, ceteris paribus, we would not have any decisive
reason to give the unit of well-being to the one in favour of the other since the total amount
of well-being in the world would be same in both cases. Or, if we are “desertian”, it can
actually be a bad thing to give someone a benefit if undeserved, even under the assumption
that it would go to waste otherwise. Thus, when evaluating a range of alternatives, we
should according to these theories choose the alternative where (1) people are sufficiently
well-off; (2) where everyone is equally well-off; (3) where those who are the worst off have
been given priority; (4) where the value is maximised; and (5) whether people get what
they deserve.
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4.1.3. Currencies
There are a range of potential values when discussing justice in relation to the Reno-
vation Wave to be sure, but the ones we are going to focus on here are those who are the
most elaborated and are sometimes called “currencies of egalitarian justice” (e.g., [113,114]).
These chief contenders today are well-being, capabilities, and resources (of course, there
are other currencies as well, such as “advantage” [114]; we will not discuss these here
for the same reasons as noted in earlier). When it comes to well-being, there are broadly
three theories: hedonism, desire theories, and objective list theories (e.g., [115,116]). What
makes a life good is simply speaking to feel good, to have your desires fulfilled, or to
have a life with characteristics that are objectively valuable. When it comes to objective
list theories, the characteristics can range from having a meaningful job; living in a decent
community; to having deep and meaningful relationships; to get recognition; or to have
control over one’s living environment—just to mention a few examples (see, e.g., [115]:
286–367, [117]). Of course, many of us desire and would take pleasure in all these things,
but according to the objective list theory, these are building blocks of a good life, whether
we want them or not. Now, according to some variations of these theories, our well-being
is not measurable in principle and much less so in practice. We will set these aside and
focus on the ones according to which we can measure states of well-being. What has
been found in psychological research is that hedonism and desire theory can come apart,
so we need to measure both to be sure that we measure what is of value. To measure
well-being, we also need a validated measure. Three of the most widely used ones are the
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) for hedonism [118], the Satisfaction with
Life Scale (SWLS) for desire theory [119], and the Questioner for Eudemonic Well-being
(QEWB) [120].
When focusing on capabilities and resources instead (the capability approach, the
human development approach) we should aim for giving people capabilities that make
them able to pursue a functioning of different sorts (i.e., realizing the capabilities) and
through this a dignified and flourishing life [121,122]. There are different views on what
these capabilities are, but Nussbaum [122] has presented and defended the most elabo-
rated account on social justice where the basic capabilities are (1) Life; (2) Bodily health;
(3) Bodily integrity; (4) Senses, imagination, and thought; (5) Emotions; (6) Practical reason;
(7) Affiliations; (8) Other species; (9) Play; and (10) Control over one’s environment. In
Nussbaum’s framework, these basic capabilities are open for interpretation but there are
still many clear cases when these are violated, and there are ways in which this framework
has been operationalized (see, e.g., [123]). Lastly, we have the resourcist view, which is very
similar to the capability view, which states that we should aim to give people resources
to be able to pursue a dignified and flourishing life with self-respect. These resources can
be, e.g., “primary goods” [124], such as income, education, and health. Again, there is
some unclarity here as to what should count as a basic good and how these should be
measured; however, there are many clear instances when these are violated and there are
also operationalizations of these views (see, e.g., [125]).
In our discussion thus far, natural- and absolute rights have been conspicuously absent,
and this will continue to be the case. To the degree we can limit the moral considerations
and thereby making the framework simpler, this is to be preferred. Thus, we will leave
out the more controversial views, such as the idea about absolute natural rights (e.g., [97]),
partly because we have found it to be incoherent, and partly because it would not have
much practical use in the debate about the Renovation Wave (for references and discussion,
see, e.g., [126]). Other non-absolutist rights, sometimes called prima facie rights (e.g., [127]),
could be derived from—and are compatible with—the normative theories presented above.
4.2. The Preliminary Framework for Just Energy Transitioning
As we saw in Section 4.1, a range of fundamental normative principles are relevant
when discussing the Renovation Wave. To simplify matters somewhat, a first step is
to get a more operational framework regarding how to approach these matters. This
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framework and its plausible effects should after consideration be acceptable for most
people. Accordingly, we will use the normative theories in Section 4.1 together with
general facts about the situations different groups of people are in, in conjunction with
what in most cases is practically feasible, and base our framework on that.
Beginning from the end, we propose the following framework named “Framework
for Just Energy Transitioning” according to which we should:
(1) Not discriminate against people on morally irrelevant grounds, such as their ethnic,
religious, sexual (etc.) orientation (the equal treatment principle).
(2) Prioritize the needs of the worst-off, with an increase in priority the worse off they
are (the priority principle).
(3) Produce the maximum benefit (in terms of well-being, capabilities, and resources) per
resource unit (the efficiency principle).
(4) Use a transparent procedure where decisions are made by reasonable, fair-minded,
well-informed, and cooperative people, among which are those who are (potentially)
negatively affected, under equal terms, and where the decisions being made can be
appealed (the principle of procedural fairness).
# Compare with Sovacool and Dworkin’s [94] definition of energy justice: “We
define an energy-just world as one that equitably shares both the benefits and
burdens involved in the production and consumption of energy services, as
well as one that is fair in how it treats people and communities in energy
decision-making. In other words, we see importance to both substantive
outcomes and decisional procedures”.
The basic idea is that (1) serves as an overriding principle that cannot be violated,
while (2) have priority over (3) even though this is not absolute, and (4) is used during the
process of the Renovation Wave, but especially when priority setting is needed, and when
we have to make (1), (2), and (3) more precise and perhaps also to add further principles.
The “benefits” and “needs” that we refer to here are all three currencies mentioned in
Section 4.1 (well-being, capabilities, and resources). Preferably, we should try to find
solutions where all these currencies converge. However, if this is not possible, (4) should be
used to adjudicate between the different values. Similarly, (4) should be used to make the
currencies more precise to the extent this is needed (see, e.g., Nussbaum’s [122] discussion
about capabilities or Herlitz and Sadek [128] about public choice and indeterminacy).
There are some caveats and clarifications to be made when it comes to the aforemen-
tioned framework. First, the equal treatment principle together with some uncontroversial
empirical statements follows from all the normative theories above and is a well-entrenched
value in many societies today. According to all normative theories, ethnicity etc. as such
does not matter morally and there are no empirical facts of the matter which gives us
reason to believe that ethnicity should influence the distribution of final or instrumental
goods. Of course, some people could be harder to benefit than others because of their
world views (etc.); but, those are then reasons (from efficiency probably) for not giving the
group priority, not that they belong to a certain ethnic group. Furthermore, since large-scale
renovation projects might be used as a cover to get rid of groups of people because they are
deemed to belong to the wrong group (think about the Roma population in Romania), it is
necessary to state this principle explicitly in a framework concerning the Renovation Wave.
Second, motivated by the increasing economic inequalities and increasingly precarious
housing situation among the worst-off, the framework states that we should prioritize the
needs of the worst-off without giving these needs absolute priority. Of course, this follows
nicely from prioritarianism since this is basically what the view entails, but it seems to us
also to follow in most cases from the other theories as well. According to utilitarianism,
the right thing to do is to maximize the total amount of benefits (over burdens). In many
situations, this could be done by prioritizing the needs of the worst-off since this will lead
to more resources to the worst-off, which according to the law of diminishing marginal of
utility will result in a greater outcome of positive value than when giving the resources to
the better off. More specifically, when renovating buildings, etc., those who are the worst
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off are in the greatest risk of being impacted most negatively, which, in turn, can be avoided
given that we take care of not pursuing those routes where these risks are. Conversely,
the same is not true when it comes to the segments of the population who are well-off.
These will probably not be of any great risk of becoming worse off in terms of receiving
a lower degree of well-being. For them, the changes in terms of higher rents, etc. will
be far less noticeable and thereby cause them a much smaller drop in well-being. These
considerations combined, i.e., the risk of loss in well-being for the worst-off while almost
no such risk exists for the well-off, the right policy to take is to guard those who are the
worst off while in exceptional circumstances deviate from this rule.
When it comes to sufficientarianism and desert instead, both theories stress that
people should be sufficiently well-off, because, e.g., they deserve it by being agents (etc.).
Accordingly, proponents of these views could argue that we thereby should give the worst-
off absolute priority and not just priority as it is now. Even though this idea has merit, we
believe that it is wrongheaded. First, if we give the worst-off absolute priority, we would
get a normative principle that would forgo a vast amount of benefits, for a large amount of
people, in order to help an extremely small number in an almost impeccable way. This is
hardly something people would accept, which we have seen in other areas such as health
care (see, e.g., [129]). People readily accept (in many cases) to prioritize the worst-off, but
not to give them absolute priority; thus implementing such a view seems not practically
feasible, and since “ought” implies “can”, we do not have a moral obligation to prioritize
the worst-off here in an absolute way since this cannot be done. Second, it is not clear that
giving the worst-off absolute priority in the context of the Renovation Wave would make
more people sufficiently well-off in general. We need to make some radical changes to meet
the challenge of climate change, and if we do not, the worst-off will suffer most. Third,
since most sufficentarians and “desertists” are pluralists, we actually do not expect that
many from that camp will oppose our principle on sufficentarian or desert-based grounds;
they will simply think that this is a measured response to the complex issue at hand.
Third, moving on to the efficiency principle, this follows nicely from utilitarianism and
prioritarianism, given the empirical facts discussed above, and when the priority principle
is given priority over the efficiency principle. Furthermore, all reasonable normative
theories allow for efficiency considerations; not doing so would be vastly counterintuitive
and hence a reductio against that theory. It is simply not plausible that efficiency should
count for nothing when evaluating and constructing social policy, which implies that
such (fundamental) normative accounts, on the face of it at least, can be discounted. The
efficiency principle also nicely explains what many people find to be wrong with giving
absolute priority to those with the greatest needs. In certain contexts, absolute priority will
simply yield too large losses in final values (such as energy savings), which is perceived as
inefficient in the sense that they could make much more good elsewhere. Exactly where
the cut-off point should be drawn is a moot question, of course, but, according to us, it
should be set using a fair process by the agents involved and will thus not be done here.
The principle of procedural fairness could in turn be grounded in the above mentioned
fundamental normative theories together with the empirical facts of the situation. However,
we will not do that here since we believe that the wider trend in political philosophy of
using procedural accounts as a complement to the non-procedural ones when these does
not, e.g., give a determinate answer or are in competition with each other in different ways
(see, e.g., Nussbaum [122], Brandstedt and Brülde [130], and Herlitz and Sadek [128]) is
justified. Using these procedurals accounts in this way should also not be objected to by
the proponents of the procedural accounts since this does not impede on the use of any of
the reasonable versions of these accounts.
Fourth, and last, when we are saying that people should be “cooperative”, this is
only meant when we have a situation where everyone is cooperative and fair minded. So,
for example, according to our framework there is no need to for tenants who are among
the least well-off to be cooperative in relation to landlords who want to evict them only
to make greater profits. This is because the landlords in this scenario are not fair minded
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or cooperative. However, it might be the case that a landlord actually has to increase the
rents somewhat in order to get an economically sustainable solution. In these kinds of
scenarios, the tenants have a responsibility not just to flatly deny any increase in rent but
need instead examine if something else could be done to keep the rents as before or accept,
if reasonable, a rent increase. Similarly, just because those who are potentially negatively
affected should have a voice in the proceeding, this does not imply that they should be able
to decide what we should do in a given situation. Their position and arguments should
count as everyone else’s and in a representative democracy; for instance, it is not clear that
people from the affected groups should have representatives other than those they selected
to represent themselves in parliament. Of course, these are thorny issues and they will
need to be resolved through debate in the settings in which they arise in a fair-minded and
cooperative manner.
To conclude this section, Figure 4 shows how fundamental normative theories and
final values have been considered within the context of imposing the Renovation Wave on
an increasingly unequal housing market, to finally form the normative framework for just
energy transitioning.
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5. Analysis of How the Reduction of Energy Use Affects People
To achieve deep energy retrofits within the Renovation Wave, and to reach the am-
bitious energy efficiency targets in the Swedish housing stock, both the technical and
behavioural approaches are likely to be used in all parts of the housing stock but with a
focus on where these measures are most effective. However, the most effective measures in
terms of “bang for the buck” or political expediency might affect the worst-off in an unjust
way. We thus need to analyse the different measures carefully in order to align ecological
and social sustainability targets.
In this section, we are going to discuss the three broad approaches, the technical
solutions, the behavioural solutions, and the area-efficiency approach. This will be done
by combining the normative framework from Section 4 with the empirical work from
Sections 2 and 3, to analyse what might need to be in place in order to avoid negative social
effects while preserving the positive ecological ones. All of this will be firmly situated in
the Swedish context.
5.1. Energy Retrofitting
As shown in Section 3, technical solutions can be very effective when trying to reduce
the energy use in the housing stock and they constitute the heart of the Renovation Wave.
There are many ways to implement these solutions on a societal level, but perhaps the most
common solution when it comes to solving almost any problem is to use our resources in
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the most cost-efficient manner. Here, this would mean that we should try to improve the
energy performance in buildings where the greatest energy savings could be achieved at
the minimum cost and climate impact; this is reflected in Swedish policy as well as in the
Renovation Wave by prioritising the buildings with the lowest energy performance, where
there are often low-hanging fruit in terms of energy savings.
There are several problems with this cost-maximization approach according to our
preliminary framework for just energy transitioning, which suggests that maximum benefit
and minimum harm should be achieved while particularly considering the implications
for the worst-off. Now, the careful reader will find that we are not (explicitly) using the
instruments for measuring the final values in Section 4.2; this does not imply that they are
not used implicitly, of course, but the main reason for not discussing the finding with these
instruments is simply because they are not needed to make the more general points we
want to make here. However, these instruments will be crucial when we want to deepen
our understanding and reasoning concerning how to create a just Renovation Wave.
First, the worst-off are overrepresented in buildings with low energy performance and
will thus be living in the most salient targets for renovation. Given the current situation
on the Swedish housing market, where pressure to increase rents in low-income areas is
high and profitability in substantial energy efficiency measures is low, low-income tenants
are exposed to a risk of increased rents when extensive energy retrofitting projects are
stimulated and/or imposed. Regardless of its magnitude, an increased rent will always
burden the worst-off more than the rest of the population as the rent already makes up
a greater part of monthly expenditures in low-income households. This means that an
increased rent in the part of the housing stock where the worst-off are overrepresented is
more likely to imply trade-offs with other expenditures, economic distress, and primary
or secondary displacement than it is in any other part of the housing stock. According to
our preliminary framework for just energy transitioning, this gives us strong reasons to
limit stimulation of retrofits among the worst-off. Targeting these buildings through e.g.,
minimum requirements for energy performance would require either regulations that limit
the rent increases or subsidies to cover rent increases over a certain level in order to protect
the most vulnerable residents.
Second, the least well-off are sometimes below the sufficiency threshold and are worse-
off in relative and absolute terms than other groups in society. When a group is below
the sufficiently threshold, we have strong justice-based reasons to raise them above and
not push them further below the threshold. Of course, one way to improve the situation
for those worse-off, considering they are overrepresented in energy-inefficient buildings,
could be to improve the energy efficiency of their housing. Energy retrofitting will most
likely improve the indoor environment, but as described above, this will also entail a
risk for increased rents. It thus becomes a question of whether the risk for increased rent
can be compensated by improvements in final values brought on by an improved indoor
environment, such as increased comfort and health.
Acknowledging the plethora of aspects that contribute to how these benefits and bur-
dens balance against each other, e.g., the health conditions of residents and the building’s
indoor climate, it can be argued that, in general, the benefits do not outweigh the burdens
in a Swedish context. This is because of the generally high standard of building insulation
and indoor environment in Swedish housing, meaning that the indoor environment rarely
is poor enough to constitute a significant health risk or a main stressor and/or insufficiency
among the worst-off. In countries with widespread issues of energy poverty, the reality of
the respective benefits and burdens is of course different as the energy-related costs and
health-effects weigh heavier.
In addition, systematic rent increases in low-income housing occur in the context
of increasing economic inequality, lack of affordable housing, and a precarious housing
market. Protecting the worst-off thus also means to protect the remaining (yet insufficient)
supply of affordable housing, as demand is increasing more rapidly than supply. This
motivates trying to limit quality upgrading renovations in the affordable housing stock,
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which, in turn, motivates avoiding extensive and unprofitable energy retrofitting in general.
For individual households, the economic burden of paying rent can be assumed to be a
greater burden among the worst-off than the burden of a sub-optimal yet adequate indoor
environment. Consequently, a decreased economic standard owing to increased rent is
likely to, in a Swedish context, push the worst-off further below the sufficiency threshold,
with little or no compensation in terms of comfort and health. Returning to our preliminary
framework for just energy transitioning, we thus find that we generally should limit the
imposition of energy retrofits among the worst-off to protect them from rent increases,
but that energy retrofits in individual cases can be motivated by a significant increase in
thermal comfort and indoor climate, thus leading to increased comfort and health.
Third, the problems from the principal of procedural justice in our framework is that
the tenants being put at the frontline of the maximization energy reduction strategy do not
have the control needed over their homes in order for the criteria of procedural justice in our
preliminary principle to be fulfilled. There are two main reasons for this: (i) the precarious
housing situation among the worst-off, directly disarming residents of their power; and
(ii) the power of landlords and their strong advantages in legal procedures. The increase in
economic inequality, residential segregation, and overcrowded apartments has resulted in
a deeply polarised housing market where some have primary and secondary residences
while others have third- or fourth-hand leases. The latter groups almost have no power in
terms of control in relation to their living situation, and their rights are close to non-existent.
Furthermore, the precarity of the situation, at times considered illegal, means that residents
sometimes are safer and better off if silent and/or conformable in retrofitting procedures.
In these extreme cases, procedural justice is difficult to ensure, which implies that decisions
taken here do not accord to procedural justice and the outcomes would thereby be unfair.
In cases where renters hold a first-hand lease, conditions for procedural justice are better,
but statistics for court rulings suggest that tenants’ position against landlords in retrofitting
processes remain weak.
To achieve a just energy transition of the housing stock according to our preliminary
framework, we are thus inclined to either minimise imposition of energy retrofits among the
worst-off or to increase tenant influence in retrofitting processes. Although there would be
many benefits from the latter, the urgency of energy efficiency targets still suggests that
maximum benefit and minimum harm could be achieved by putting a less vulnerable part
of the population at the frontline of the energy transition. As higher income earners tend to
live in their own houses or in tenant-owned apartments, where they have both great insight
and control over what is done with their homes, they have, at least in general, access to
procedures where they can make decisions that could be perceived as fair according to our
preliminary framework.
In conclusion, we find that considering the current situation on the housing market,
characterised by energy-, economic-, and housing-related inequalities, where private hous-
ing companies in particular are prone to maximising profit with little or no consideration
of tenants, our normative principle with a focus on the worst-off gives us strong reasons to
not initiate the Renovation Wave in the worst-performing part of the multifamily building
stock, as suggested by a general maximisation strategy without subsidies or other forms
of protection. Although improved energy performance of housing is needed and would
benefit the residents among the worst-off, it would be more justifiable to focus on less
extensive retrofitting in these areas, where energy performance is improved but not to
the extent that is promoted through deep retrofitting in the Renovation Wave. The more
extensive the retrofitting project is, the greater the tension between energy savings and
profitability will be, which, in turn, will increase the risk of landlords carrying out rent-
increasing measures. Less extensive energy retrofitting will thus reduce the risks for the
worst-off, but when carried out on a pressured housing market, there will still be incentives
to include rent-increasing measures in the retrofitting project. Overall, motivated by an
immediate concern for the worst-off residents as well as a long-term concern regarding the
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supply of affordable housing, our normative principle advises us to limit the imposition of
extensive energy retrofits among the worst-off.
If we, for political or ecological reasons, must prioritise energy retrofitting in these
buildings despite the associated risks, it is of high importance to establish regulations
and/or procedures that minimise the risk of harming the worst-off. For example, we
might enact policies that compensate for the demands put on the least well-off, such as
housing allowances in cases where imposed energy retrofits lead to a plethora of retrofitting
measures, ultimately increasing the rents. Another alternative is to give the tenants more
power over their living situation, by e.g., demanding that tenants must be able to choose
from different renovation options in their apartment interior with different levels of rent
increases, where the least expensive option preferably cannot entail any rent increases at all.
5.2. Economic Incentives for More Energy-Efficient Behaviour
Although the realistic energy savings potential from behavioural solutions are not
thought to be as great as from technical solutions, their impact remains valuable and they
constitute an important part of the EU’s energy-efficiency policy. Behavioural solutions
are to some extent more compatible with our framework than the technical ones, since the
behavioural solutions are more voluntary in nature; this is because, for instance, people
receive more capabilities in these contexts, and the worst-off can opt out if they want
to and therefore are not as negatively affected as when the solutions are involuntary.
Nevertheless, economic incentives for more energy-efficient behaviour will in many cases
be more “effective” in households where economic resources are limited, and may, as we
shall see, entail various risks for low-income households. The efficacy of such measures
also depends on energy prices and the residents’ potential to adjust one’s energy use. In
single-family houses, all energy use is already metered and billed per individual household,
meaning that implementation of policy becomes relevant in multifamily buildings only.
Household electricity use is already metered and billed individually in most multifamily
buildings in Sweden, while energy for heating and domestic hot water remain collectively
managed in most multifamily buildings.
The premises for individualisation of energy for heating and energy for domestic hot
water differ; while the potential to reduce energy use for heating through behavioural
changes decreases as buildings’ energy performance improve, the potential to reduce en-
ergy use for domestic hot water remains high regardless of buildings’ energy performance.
A cost-effectiveness maximisation strategy will thus put a focus on worst-performing build-
ings in the case of energy for heating, but not in the case of energy for domestic hot water.
Starting with the latter, we know that although individualisation of metering and billing
of energy for domestic hot water does not particularly put a focus on the worst-off, it has
been shown that the worst-off are disproportionally burdened by such measures in terms
of increased costs, as the number of residents per household tends to be higher among the
worst-off in combination with more time spent at home owing to, e.g., unemployment and
long-term illness.
Although individual metering and billing of energy for domestic hot water is by
many considered a more fair option than the collective method—as it after all removes
issues of households under- or over-paying for their water consumption—the effects of
individualising hot water consumption will in many cases imply a severe increase in costs
among the worst-off. Consequently, it is not excessive water consumption that will be
primarily penalised, but rather a larger-than-average household size; this in spite of the
fact that a larger household size significantly reduces households’ overall resource use as
well as per capita water consumption.
Returning to our preliminary framework for a just energy transition of the housing
stock, we find that in order to protect the worst-off from significant increases in energy costs
and the negative effects this brings to their well-being (etc.) given their precarious financial
state, we have reasons to avoid implementation of individual metering and billing of
energy for domestic hot water among the worst-off. It is likely that the burden of increased
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energy costs will be smaller in more affluent parts of the housing stock, and the likelihood
to accurately target excessive water consumption rather than “excessive” household size
will be higher.
Considering the case of energy for heating instead, we know that such policy dis-
proportionately affects the worst-off as maximisation strategies target worst-performing
buildings. This was evident in the regulation that was recently passed in Sweden, demand-
ing individual metering and billing of energy for heating in worst-performing multifamily
buildings. Hitherto, little is known regarding how the worst-off will be affected by this
new regulation. Of course, the implications will be highly dependent on local energy prices
for heating as well as the building’s heating system, where e.g., heat pumps significantly
contribute to a lower heating cost. We can, however, assume that there are very few heat
pumps among the worst-performing buildings.
Nevertheless, among the worst-off, heating cost might be an expenditure that is worth
compromising to afford other necessities, especially during the colder winter months. As
heating costs, when part of the “warm rent”, are equal each month throughout the year, the
new cost, although perhaps not higher in total, will be distributed differently over the year.
It is not evident that this constitutes a burden; however, as heating costs are the highest
when outdoor temperature is the lowest, there is a risk that those who are economically
worst-off will try to limit their heating demand during the colder months (when heating
costs peak) and thus experience an impaired indoor environment and perhaps suffer from
negative health implications. Although it can be argued that the higher heating costs
during winter should be compensated by the lower heating costs during summer, it can be
questioned to what extent such a redistribution of expenditures will actually be successful.
Returning to our normative framework for just energy transitioning, we thus find that we
have reasons to either exempt the worst-off from implementation of individual metering
and billing of energy for heating, or to implement policies, e.g., subsidies or landlords
measuring indoor temperature in apartments, to ensure that sufficient heating can be
provided to sustain an adequate indoor climate and thermal comfort.
5.3. Reducing per Capita Living Space
We have seen that when targeting buildings’ energy performance, maximisation strate-
gies inevitably point towards the worst-performing buildings, where worst-off residents
are overrepresented. However, when targeting per capita energy use, we find the least
efficient individuals, i.e., those with the greatest energy use per capita, among the best-off
owing to a relatively large living space per capita in this segment. In the Renovation Wave,
as well as in most energy performance policies, there is a one-sided focus on buildings’
energy use, with little or no recognition of people’s energy use in terms of how much heated
housing area different groups in society are claiming, as well as the use of other resources,
such as water and materials, that an increased area use entails. This one-sided focus leads
to a neglect of the economic inequalities that cause high-income earners to afford large, yet
energy-efficient housing, and low-income earners to afford small, but energy-inefficient
housing. To some extent, this strong consideration of technology rather than practices makes
current energy performance policies unequal and arguably inherently targeted towards the
worst-off.
The increasing differences in living space per capita in Sweden—where high-income
earners have increasing or unchanged living space per person whereas low-income earners
are living on smaller and smaller areas per person—have several implications for what
constitutes just energy transitioning. Among the lowest income earners, there has been
an increase in overcrowded apartments, meaning that there is an increasing number of
households with insufficient access to living space per capita and a decrease in well-being
and health. As argued above, our preliminary framework for just energy transitioning
gives us strong reasons to not further impair the situation for the worst-off. However,
considering the increasingly frequent over-crowdedness, we also have strong reasons to
improve the situation by increasing the living space per capita among the worst-off. Among
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the highest income earners, there is instead an excessive use of living space, and thus
energy, per capita, suggesting that living space could be reduced; of course, without pushing
households below a sufficiency threshold and into over-crowdedness. In other words, there
is a growing need for a redistribution of area in the housing stock.
Although this remains unrecognised in energy policy, our normative framework for
just energy transitioning suggests that a reduced living space per capita among the highest
income earners could be a just means to reduce energy use in the housing stock. This could
simultaneously reduce excessive energy use among the best-off and make living space
available for over-crowded households. Of course, policy of this kind is likely to face a lot
of resistance, and it is also unlikely that the released living space among the best-off would
be economically available to the worst-off. Nevertheless, there are means in which such a
redistribution of living space could be indirectly performed.
One example is through re-implementing progressive property taxation. It is likely
that such taxation to some extent would limit the living space per capita in the wealthiest
part of the housing stock, while at the same time redistributing wealth to the worst-off.
This would reduce economic inequalities, and the improved economic standard among the
worst-off could in turn allow them to access greater living space per capita. The multiple
benefits of such taxation could thus be that energy use is reduced, that economic and living
standard is improved among the worst-off, and that the root of the challenge for a just
energy transition—economic inequality—is counteracted as well. In light of our normative
framework for just energy transitioning, we have strong reasons to question the fact that
energy retrofitting is requested in overcrowded low-income multifamily housing while
little political action is being taken to reduce the excessive use of space, and thus energy, in
the villas and summer residences in higher-income segments.
5.4. Summary of Analysis
What we find from the above analyses is that both technical and behavioural solutions
entail higher risks for the worst-off than for the rest of the population, whereas area-related
solutions are likely to burden the most well-off more than the worst-off. This is shown
in Table 2. What we know from Section 3 is that among these three main approaches,
the former two dominate in terms of recognition and reliance for energy savings. Yet,
these approaches evidently risk leading to immediate injustices for individual residents
and could also contribute to increased long-term inequalities by limiting the supply of
affordable housing, which, in turn, will have a negative impact on the well-being (etc.)
of the worse-off and hence be unjust according to our framework. More so, we find that
Sweden is currently implementing policies to economically incentivise residents to reduce
their energy use, an approach that has relatively low energy-saving potential according to
empirical evidence and that has relatively low compliance with our framework (Table 2). It
thus seems as if this approach in a Swedish context has a relatively high risk and relatively
low reward, which should be considered moving forward.
Table 2. Summary of Section 3 combined with the results from the analysis in Section 5.
Approach Energy Savings Potential











Greater potential and higher
cost-effectiveness in buildings
with low energy performance
Highly recognised










highly endorsed Relatively low compliance
More efficient use of
living space
Can reduce demand for
new construction
Primarily affluent parts of
housing stock where living space
per capita is large
Unrecognised High compliance
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The results in Table 2 can be understood as a mismatch between the most feasible
approaches in terms of energy savings and the most acceptable approaches according to
our framework for just energy transitioning. Looking at the energy transition of Swedish
housing from an overall perspective, the mismatch in Table 2 reflects a lack of recognition
of how economic inequalities allow high-income earners to afford large, yet energy-efficient
housing, and low-income earners to afford small, but energy-inefficient housing, and how
this in turn influences energy use among different income groups.
The conflict between the most recognised and relied-upon approaches in terms of
energy savings and the most acceptable approaches in terms of social justice calls for new
approaches and/or policy and subsidies that effectively bridge this mismatch. In some
cases, policy and subsidies could target both sustainability pillars with one policy, such as
green rent subsidies, or the establishment of pooled resources for long-term investments.
Unfortunately, decision makers do not only need to take the societal targets into account;
political constraints and time constraints also often dictate what is possible to achieve. To
navigate these issues of different societal targets and constraints, a clear decision tree can
assist decision makers when making decisions on these complex matters. The following
example showcases how this could be done:
During the spring of 2021, the authors of this article worked for the Swedish authorities
and provided analyses of the building stock for the development of an energy-efficiency
subsidy scheme. A simple decision tree was provided that can be summarized into the
following steps: (1) change the legal framework for the housing industry to allow long-term
investments through pooled or accrued funds; (2) if the budgeted subsides need to be
spent during this term, then implement green rent subsidies that address both social and
environmental targets; and (3) if it is not possible to merge targets for political reasons, then
add funding also for conventional support programs for disadvantaged groups affected by
the renovation subsides, such as housing subsidies or welfare levels.
Based on the analysis in this section, the following section will revisit the prelim-
inary framework for just energy transitioning and further detail how the different ap-
proaches can be carried out in accordance with this framework by extending it with
concrete policy recommendations.
6. Policy Recommendations for the Swedish Context
Starting with a selection of normative theories relevant to the case of the Renovation
Wave in a context of economic and housing-related inequalities, a Framework for Just
Energy Transitioning was derived in Section 3, stating that the energy transition of the
housing stock should comply with the following ordered principles:
(1) The equal treatment principle;
(2) The priority principle;
(3) The efficiency principle;
(4) The principle of procedural fairness.
Based on the analysis and discussion in Section 5, we are now in a better position
to offer more concrete policy recommendations for the Swedish context grounded in
the Framework for Just Energy Transitioning; this is shown in Figure 5, which also in a
transparent way shows the schematic process through which the framework was developed
and the final policy recommendations derived. The policy recommendations echo the
conclusions that were drawn in Section 5, but also provide some preliminary suggestions
of how the identified mismatch between effective approaches for energy savings and socially
just approaches for energy savings can be bridged. These policy recommendations should be
seen as an initial step in the discussion on how to achieve a socially just energy transition
of the Swedish multifamily building stock in general, and a socially just Renovation Wave
in particular.
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7. Conclusions Regarding a Just Renovation Wave in the Swedish Context
The energy transition as a whole is occurring under an era of increasing economic
inequalities, and the Renovation Wave will roll over an unequal housing stock where
consideration must be given to the unequal abilities among residents to influence and
afford energy retrofitting. This means that measures for reduced energy use in the hous-
ing stock must be targeted to where the risks for negative social consequences are the
smallest, while also being effective in their quest to reduce energy use. By considering the
Swedish case—where social benefits of the Renovation Wave are expected to be relatively
low due to the general lack of energy poverty and relatively high housing standards—a
normative framework for a just energy transition of the housing stock was developed.
The framework utilised normative theories relevant to the distribution of benefits and
burdens between different social groups, from which principles that were of particular
relevance to the Renovation Wave and the context of increasing economic inequalities on a
pressured housing market were derived. For example, a priority principle giving special
priority to the worst-off was considered important in the framework given the increasing
economic and housing-related inequalities, and a principle of procedural fairness was
considered important owing to the nature of renovation processes. The framework consists
of the following four ordered principles that should be followed in order to achieve a just
Renovation Wave:
(1) The equal treatment principle;
(2) The priority principle;
(3) The efficiency principle;
(4) The principle of procedural fairness.
By applying the framework to the Swedish context, we were able to evaluate the social
justice implications of current and upcoming political strategies, such as the Renovation
Wave, but also to identify less recognised approaches for reduced energy use in the housing
stock that were more likely to be just according to our framework. It was found that in
contradistinction to what is suggested in the Renovation Wave, we should avoid imposing
the Renovation Wave among the worst-off and instead focus extensive energy retrofits,
when motivated, in more affluent parts of the housing stock where vulnerability to rent
increases is lower and tenant influence is likely to be higher. Among the worst-off, we
find strong justice-based reasons for less extensive renovations that aim to maintain an
adequate housing standard and protect the supply of affordable housing, and we also find
reasons to limit implementation of economic incentives for more energy-efficient behaviour
that risk creating new issues of energy poverty. Finally, it was found that efforts to reduce
energy use through reduced living space per capita, a generally less recognised approach
than energy retrofitting, could be an approach that unlike the Renovation Wave would not
put the worst-off at the greatest risks in the energy transition of the housing stock, as it
would target excessive use of living space in higher income segments instead.
The situation and challenges connected to housing and energy use are different in dif-
ferent EU member states, which means that the trade-offs between potential positive social
outcomes and potential negative social outcomes from the Renovation Wave will balance
differently. The Swedish case is an exception within the EU in terms of a high housing
standard, a lack of energy poverty, and a lack of a social housing sector; but the context of
increasing economic and housing-related inequalities is not unique to Sweden. Analysing
trade-offs in the Renovation Wave will thus be equally important in other countries, and
the normative framework developed for the Swedish context in this paper can thus be
used as a model for similar nation-specific frameworks and policy recommendations in
other jurisdictions.
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